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The Syrian crisis has shed a light on the tragedy of refugee flows and on the behaviour of states 
when dealing with this tragedy, underlining the shortcomings of the current refugee protection 
framework. The forced displacement resulting from the Syrian crisis has placed the questions of 
state responsibility and refugee agency at the forefront of forced displacement debates. Indeed, 
refugees are increasingly being seen as security threats, not only by the potential host countries 
in the West, but also by the neighbouring countries in the region where most of the world’s 
refugee populations reside.  This dissertation focuses on Lebanon’s policies of securitization 
regarding its refugee population from Syria since 2011. It will first present a conceptual 
framework of the theory of securitization, and will argue that the Copenhagen School of Security 
is not, on its own, adequate to deconstruct and understand the securitization of refugees from 
Syria in Lebanon. The dissertation will argue that a more sociological approach of securitization 
and a study of the context are required to better comprehend the process; consequently, the 
thesis will also take on a socio-political, and psycho-cultural analysis of Lebanon.  
 
This conceptual and contextual analysis will help put forward the paradox of securitization. In 
other words, the increased concerns about security and policies emanating from emergency 
politics enabled a flawed sense of security, and often put at risk the population the policies were 
trying to protect. Indeed, the current securitization policies in Lebanon not only inflict human 
rights abuses on the refugee populations, but also create protection gaps for the Lebanese 
populations. These human rights and protection gaps are also the result of the current Refugee 
Convention and international community dynamics. This essay will therefore put forward the 
discussion regarding the role of non-traditional actors, such as development actors, in dealing 
with large flows of forced displacement, in an age where refugee displacement has become 
increasingly protracted. It will address the benefits of expanding the set of actors involved in 
protecting and managing refugees, and will explore the undergoing development projects 
involving refugees in countries similar to Lebanon.   
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This dissertation aims at underlining the shortcomings of both the securitization theory and the 
current refugee protection framework when operating in countries of first asylum. To do so it will 
take as case study the securitization of refugees from Syria who have arrived in Lebanon from 2011 
onwards. It will argue that the securitization of refugees from Syria is due to the wider socio-
cultural, environmental, political and economic context, which has allowed the state and the key 
power holders to characterize the refugees as security threats, resulting in the use of emergency 
measures to deal with refugees. The emergency measures were meant to protect the status quo and 
the Lebanese community. However, due to the inherently unstable context of Lebanon and the 
limitations of both the securitization process and the wider international refugee protection 
framework, both the refugee and host communities were the victims of human rights abuses and 
protection gaps. Consequently, the dissertation will tackle the following questions: What is 
securitization? What is the role of the Lebanese context in the securitization of refugees? What 
human rights and protection gaps were inflected on the various communities? Is the current 
international framework regarding refugees doomed? 
 
Background: 
A refugee is defined by Article 1 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (CRSR’51) 
as: “a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of 
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
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of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”1 
 
It can be argued that the securitization of refugees is a rather new phenomenon. Indeed, migration, 
and forced migrants in particular, were first introduced on the security agenda of states after the 
Cold War. This was the result of a shift from a state-centric approach to security, to a more 
individual based approach where the person becomes the referent object2, meaning that the security 
field, and the security agenda of sovereign states, has widened and deepened. This observation does 
not mean that the traditional security concerns (i.e. war, military campaigns, weapons etc.) were 
ignored, but rather that new ones emerged. These new security threats can be organized into five 
categories: environmental, political, societal, military and economic. The expansion of the 
spectrum of security has led to the materialization of a modern literature and to a merging of 
theoretical concepts pertaining to the field of Security Studies explaining the correlation between 
migration and security. This relatively modern focus on the relationship between forced migration 
and security stems from two conceptual and historical factors. 
 
Historically, two main events explain this expanded security framework. First, the crumbling of 
the Soviet Union resulted in a wave of Eastern immigrants towards Western countries. The 
historical context of the relationship between the two spheres resulted in the West identifying this 
migration flow in security terms, and placing it high on its security agenda. The second empirical 
example is the aftermath of the Iraq War of 1990; indeed, the latter conflict resulted in a 
strengthening of the moral conscience of the global order as a response of the large-scale minority 
                                                     
1 The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) Article 1 
2 A referent object is defined “as the unit for which the threat is securitized” (Buzan 1991) 
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cleansing and forced displacement. The conflict introduced both the concepts of new wars, where 
ethnic cleansing became a means to an end, and the norm of humanitarian intervention. From that 
point on, the management of refugees was seen as an integral part of the peace-building and 
security-building strategies in the post-conflict environment.  
 
Conceptually, the intersection of the fields of security and migration is a result of the gradual 
criticism of realist theory; the criticism of the realist approach to the global order and the widening 
and deepening of the security agenda, a debate over what constitutes security and what is meant by 
security emerged. This re-defining of security parameters and criteria of threats has led to a more 
liberal take on risk management. The liberal approach of threat assessment is inherently ever-
changing and heterogeneous, as it is heavily influenced by political and state interests. 
Consequently, it has left the door open for an easy securitization of migration, forced or not, in the 
contemporary era. 
 
In order to illustrate the process of constructing a security threat, this work will explore the case of 
refugees from Syria in Lebanon. The flow of refugees from Syria to Lebanon started as early as 
2011, as a result of the Syrian civil war. The first wave was escaping the repression of Bashar al-
Assad, whereas the ones that followed were fleeing both atrocities conducted by the government 
and the surfacing of extremist groups. In September 2016, UNHCR claims that more than 1.3 
million refugees from Syria – mainly Syrians, Palestinians, Kurds and Iraqis – are currently 
residing in Lebanon, of which only 287,651 are registered.3  
 
                                                     
3 UNHCR, “Syria Regional Refugee Response” (2016) 
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Plan 
To fulfil its objectives, this dissertation is divided into five chapters. The first chapter serves as a 
conceptual framework on which the rest of thesis depends. It explores the theory of securitization, 
the main criticism and changes to the theory in the past decades, and the underlying, interrelated 
notions of biopolitics, nation-building and Protracted Social Conflicts-- key to understanding the 
securitization of identity and migration in Lebanon.  The second chapter focuses on the contextual 
framework within which the refugees found themselves after finding asylum in Lebanon. The 
analysis allows for identification of the securitizing actors and for a better understanding of the 
socio-political, economic and psycho-cultural context that has allowed the Lebanese population to 
become a receptive audience to the moves of the securitizing actors. The third chapter addresses 
the human rights abuses and protection gaps resulting from the securitization of refugees, affecting 
both the refugee communities and the national population. It puts forward the resulting legal 
frameworks deployed to control and govern refugees, and how the latter translate on the ground 
(i.e. analyzing the different abuses.) The fourth and fifth chapter both tackle the question of whether 
or not the current refugee protection framework is doomed. The fourth chapter analyzes the 
shortcomings of the CRSR’51, but also argues that a re-drafting of the Convention will be more 
dangerous than effective. The fifth chapter tackles the potential of development actors in improving 
the integration and protection of refugees in countries of first asylum. The final chapter underlines 
the need for non-traditional developmental agencies, and their partners, to complement the work 
of traditional humanitarian agencies in the management of refugees, especially because of the 
increasingly protracted nature of forced displacement. Protracted displacement is defined is a 
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refugee situation in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile 
for more than five years.4 
  
                                                     
4 UNHCR, “Conclusions on Protracted refugees” (2009) 
 12 
CHAPTER 1 – THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter will explore the theory of securitization, its main proponents, its shortcomings, and 
alternative approaches best suited to explore the phenomenon of securitization of refugees in 
particular contexts, such as Lebanon. Indeed, this section of the dissertation will argue that while 
the Copenhagen School of Security (CSS) represents a cornerstone in the study of the security field 
in the post-Cold War era, it does not take into account a number of interrelated theories needed to 
deconstruct the process of securitization. Consequently, Balzacq’s sociological approach to the 
theory of securitization will be put forward, as well as correlated concepts that will help create a 
coherent framework to deconstruct and understand how refugees are addressed in the framework 
of securitization. The latter concepts are: Foucault’s biopolitics, Arendt’s understanding of 
nationhood and Azar’s theory of Protracted Social Conflict.  
 
a) Securitization theory: 
The field of security has expanded since the end of the Cold War, which allowed for alterations in 
the nature of threats. Indeed, by the 1990s, the definition of security widened and deepened, 
introducing five sectors, which each categorize the nature of an existential issue: military, political, 
economic, societal and environmental. This re-conception and re-definition of these emerging 
categories of threats is due to the fact that the state is no longer at the centre of the securitization 
conceptual framework; indeed, in the past decades, it is the individual that has taken centre-stage. 
As Buzan argued, the individual becomes “the irreducible basic unit to which the concept of 
security can be applied to.”5 
                                                     
5 Buzan “People, States and Fear” (1991), p 23 
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Securitization is defined by the Copenhagen School of Security as “the positioning through speech 
acts of a particular issue as a threat to survival, which in turn enables emergency measures and the 
suspension of normal politics in dealing with an issue.”6 Securitization and the CSS therefore don’t 
focus on defining what constitutes security or a security threat, but rather on explaining how a 
threat is constructed; a successful securitization indicates a successful construction and wide 
perception of an issue as a threat rather than the policies and power deployed to neutralize said 
threat. Thus, securitization focuses on the question: what are the processes through which security 
threats are constructed?7 
 
The Copenhagen School emphasizes the discursive nature of securitization; it focuses on what 
speaking security entails. Drawing on Austin’s and Searle’s constructivist language theory, “by 
saying the words, something is done.” Consequently, securitization becomes understood as speech 
acts, as performatives. Indeed, Waever argues that “security is not of interest as a sign that refers 
to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, 
giving a promise, or naming a ship).”8This means, that by bringing an issue into the field of 
security, by claiming it is a matter of security, the urgency that it emanates takes priority. The field 
of security is therefore self-referential; an issue becomes part of security matters because it has 
been labelled as such. This escalation of an issue from ordinary politics to emergency politics has 
given the pretext for some actors to act in a preventive and pre-emptive manner with an urgent 
                                                     
6 Buzan, Wæver, De Wilde (1998) p 78 
7 T. Balzacq “A theory of securitization: origins, core assumptions and variants” (2011), p 89 
8 Wæver (1995), p 118 
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response, resulting in the justification of the use exceptional measures (often involving violence) 
to counter and eliminate the threat, or constructed threat.9  
 
b) Criticism of the Copenhagen School of Security 
 
Criticism of the Copenhagen School’s approach to securitization has led to the materialization of 
two camps: the wideners (who support the shift from the state centric approach to an individual 
based securitization) and the traditionalists (who believe that the true referent object of security 
should be the state.)10 This division is also reflected among the wideners, especially concerning the 
definition of securitization. Indeed, there is no neutral definition of the concept, meaning that the 
definition of securitization cannot stem from objectivity.11 This inherently subjective characteristic 
of the process has led others to argue that it widens the security agenda a little too much, so much 
so that it can lead to its nullification of the security agenda by incorporating every perceived threat 
to every individual.12 The questions become: Where should the line of security be drawn? Whose 
security is more important? Who is the other that should be securitized? The latter is especially 
true, and dangerous, when deconstructing the securitization of refugees or other instances of forced 
migration, where the other, seen as upsetting the established societal, political, economic and 
environmental equilibrium, represents a threat to a community due to the widening and deepening 
of the security agenda.  
 
                                                     
9 Balzacq, “Enquiries into methods: a new framework for securitization analysis”, p 35 
10 Balzacq, “Enquiries into methods: a new framework for securitization analysis”, p 35 
11 Ibid. p 66 
12 Ibid. p 70 
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Another criticism of the Copenhagen School of securitization is the fact that it is too Eurocentric, 
and that the application of this perception of the concept of security cannot be applied beyond the 
borders of the Western world.13 Indeed, the plurality of the notions of power, security, and national 
interest, which are key in the concept of securitization, are not approached or understood the same 
worldwide. The CSS seems to underline that “the constitution of agency proposed by securitization 
is a symptom of the Westphalian straitjacket that limits the CSS’s ability to theorize outside a Euro-
centric frame.”14 This concept of security was developed in a very peculiar context, namely the end 
of the Cold War and its repercussions on Europe.15 This led to the rise of a societal security as a 
direct response to the issue of foreigners’ integration within the Western societies. This underlines 
that the CSS’ approach of security is based on a Western understanding of state-society relations 
and may not be applicable in all cases that have a different understanding of state-society 
dynamics.16 
 
Additionally, as mentioned, CSS relies heavily on the concept of speaking security, underlining 
the predominance of the discursive characteristic of securitization. Indeed, the act of speaking 
security seems to allow an “enactment of exceptionalism in political life”,17 which could be 
detrimental in the long-term for democracies, as it could infringe on personal liberties and 
democratic ideals. Moreover, in some cases where securitization is successful, the ability to speak 
can be constrained, and at times the entire process can occur without the presence of speech acts, 
which led some to question the centrality the CSS gives it. Bigo argues through the case study of 
                                                     
13 Ibid. p 100 
14 Ibid. p 101 
15 Balzacq (2011) p 103 
16 Ibid. p 105 
17 Fako “strategies of desecuritization” (2012) p 21 
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immigrants in Europe that CSS’ view of securitization reaffirms security professionals’ and the 
traditional elites’ positions as legitimate authorities on what constitutes a threat to the collective.18 
By underlining this balance of power and attributing to the latter groups the power of persuasion, 
the “CS fails to challenge traditional structures of power that deny security to those who are not 
authorized to speak security.”19 This leads to Hansen’s criticism of the illocutionary emphasis of 
the CSS’ conception of securitization; she argues that this characterization of securitization makes 
it exclusive and marginalizes the ones who cannot speak security because they do not seem to have 
the legitimacy or the authority to do so, undermining minority rights.20 She uses the example of 
women in Pakistan victim of sexual or physical assaults, who she argues are silenced by the CSS’ 
approach to security, and therefore cannot securitize threats such as sexual assaults. She concludes 
that, indirectly, CSS results in securitization perpetrating an undermining of minorities’ political 
power and rights, resulting in groups not being capable of becoming a referent object.21 
 
Finally, the reliance on the discursive aspect of securitization undermines the centrality of 
emotions, especially the one of fear, in influencing how an audience reacts when faced with an 
issue characterized as an existential threat.22 Van Rythoyen claims that “collective fears, serve as 
the locus of an audience’s judgement for the practice of securitization.”23 The CSS fails to provide 
a coherent model of analysis for theorizing this important fear factor, and therefore fails to 
understand the societal dynamics required for a successful securitization. Indeed, as Huysmans 
underlines “fear is a particular principle of making human relations intelligible in a certain way.”24 
                                                     
18 Ibid. p 21 
19Hansen Lene, (2000), p 290  
20 Hansen Lene, (2000) p 291 
21 Ibid. p 294 
22 Moller (2007), p 179 
23 Rythoyen (2011), p 458 
24 Huysmans (2006), p 52 
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From this criticism we can also understand that the CSS overemphasizes the role of the securitizing 
actor, at the expense of the centrality of the audience. The CSS does not sufficiently explore the 
interactive nature of the securitizing procedure25; the Copenhagen School seems to picture the 
audience as a passive receiver, which fails to consider the possibility of acts of resistance from the 
targeted audience, embodied by the trend of desecuritization. 
 
c) The securitization of identity 
The Copenhagen School’s shortcomings make it inadequate to understand the securitization of 
refugees and identity in certain contexts. Therefore, a new, more sociological and constructivist 
approach toward securitization has emerged. The latter, in the case of refugees, depends on a 
variety of interrelated concepts. Indeed, as Balzacq argues, securitization is a “set of interrelated 
practices and the process of their production, diffusion and reception or translation that bring 
threats into being.”26 This section of the chapter will explore three theories that complement a 
coherent deconstruction of the securitization of refugees: Foucault’s biopolitics, Arendt’s work on 
nation-building, and Azar’s theory of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC). All three offer a theoretical 
understanding of how communities are pit against one another, allowing for the use of emergency 
of policies, resulting the exclusion of a community from the political, social and economic spheres 
of a state. 
 
i) Biopolitics 
Foucault’s concept of biopolitics focuses primarily on the role of power relations, administrative 
politics and the interests of institutions to determine what or who is included in the securitization 
                                                     
25 Rythoyen (2011), p 461 
26 Balzacq (2011), p 32 
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process, which also includes what measures are to be taken to deal with the situation.27 
Securitization becomes less about the dramatics of speech acts and more about control of 
populations by specific actors as part of their risk management and governmental strategies (ex: 
surveillance) as a way to achieve balance and regularity within a state. This leads to an increase of 
state power and control over the people, which can have as a consequence the re-affirming and 
strengthening of the power held by the established elites.28 Indeed, in the word of Foucault, 
biopower is a political power that “deals with the population as a political problem.”29 This 
development has resulted in excluding people who are considered as improper, out of place or 
dangerous, creating a divide between the good and safe individuals the bad and dangerous others 
as to maintain the way a certain way of life.30 This rise in biopolitics in how the international 
community operates has allowed for the characterization of refugees, who are inherently moving 
bodies, as threats to the equilibrium resulting in the perceived need for greater regulation to inhibit 
the integration of the other in the society.31 
 
ii) Security and Nationhood 
 One of the related notions and theory often associated with securitization is that of nationalism 
and nation building. Some perceived the pitting of communities against one another as a strategy 
to create a nation around the elites’ interests, embedding the process of state building into the one 
of nation building; therefore, a threat to the state became a threat to the nation and vice versa.32 As 
Buzan argues, identity and societal security became at the centre of the nation building. 33 From 
                                                     
27 Balzacq(2011), p 210 
28 Ibid. p211 
29 Foucault (2003), p 8  
30 Duffield (2007), p 14 
31 Edkins (2008), p 221 
32 B. Anderson “The nation as an imagined community” (1983), p 45 
33 Buzan (1991), p 65 
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this it can be argued that the nation also became an incremental part of security; as a result, migrants 
and refugees, taking on the role of the constructed other in our reasoning, became a threat to 
community’s cohesion, the nation and the state, making their securitization seem as primordial for 
survival. 
 
This demonization of the other, in our case the refugee, can be explained by comparing it to a pre-
Nazi and post-World War II Europe.34 Indeed, during that period of time we could witness an 
undermining of civic rights explained by the emergence of an ethnic based nationalism. Arendt 
argues that the latter phenomenon started in Europe due to a combination of the disintegration of 
the European Great Empires and the social and economic crisis that led to an increase in 
unemployment.35 Indeed, the Empires used hatred directed at minorities to consolidate the power; 
hence, when they collapsed, there was no solidarity to be found within the territory, resulting in 
mass migration flows within Eastern Europe, and from Eastern Europe to Western Europe.36 This 
intra-state competition was complemented with inter-state hatred, which was also based on ethnic 
and cultural criteria. Therefore, the migration of the other to one’s nation was regarded as a threat 
not only to the culture, but also to their economic and social prosperity.37 Arendt argues that it is 
at this point in time that a new principle of nation state emerges; a new principle that completely 
bypasses the needed balance between nation and state, and tilts in favour of nationality solely.38 
Indeed, a state based on civic rights defines its citizenship regardless of ethnic, tribal, language, 
cultural or religious criteria, in order to create a community sharing similar political and normative 
                                                     
34 Arendt “The Decline of the Nation State and the end of the rights of Men” (1958), p 276 
35 Ibid. p 280 
36 Arendt. p 270 
37 Ibid. p 278 
38 Ibid.p 282 
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values, whereas an ethnic based nation solely relies on a common culture and enables the “triumph 
of nation over the state.”39 Consequently, the rise of the latter version of a nation makes 
membership to a state exclusive to a certain group, making any individual not able to be granted 
membership to the group, due to subjective factors, a threat to the status quo.  
 
iii) Protracted Social Conflicts 
In many ways security and identity are embedded in and re-enforce one another. E. Azar 
characterizes the interaction between the two notions, as well as between the different identities in 
one geographical space as Protracted Social Conflicts40, or PSC, which he defines as hostile 
interactions between the different groups caused by biased persistent and elongated hatred based 
on subjective characteristics, such as race, ethnicity or religion.41 Azar argues that PSC occurs 
when communities are in deprivation, where the latter is caused by a complex chain of events 
involving the states of the geographical space and the pattern of international linkages.42 However, 
much like securitization, underlying conditions are necessary to shape the set of conditions that are 
responsible for the shift from a non-conflictual setting to a conflictual one (ex: domestic historical 
setting, colonial legacy, or the multi-communal make up of a society) Azar identifies four variables 
key to PSC: communal content, human needs, the role of the state, and international linkages.43 
 
Communal (dis)content: 
                                                     
39 Ibid. p 279 
40 Fako (2012), p 34 
41 Ibid. p 36 
42 Azar, “The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases” (Aldershot, Dartmout 1990) p &2 
43 Ibid. p 1 
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Azar puts forward the argument that the societies that are the most vulnerable to form and undergo 
Protracted Social Conflicts are the ones which are composed of multiple communities. Indeed, he 
underlines that multi-communal societies results from either former colonial divide and rule 
policies or through historical rivalries, leading to the dominance of one group over another.44  This 
communal and cultural balance of power between societies were institutionalized, creating a 
disarticulation between the state and the society as the state would be considered as unresponsive 
to the needs of the other groups.45 
 
Human needs: 
The second variable used by Azar to explain the emergence of PSC is a set of considerations taken 
on by the individual, contingent upon the satisfaction of basic needs. The latter are: individual and 
communal survival, and well being. These needs should not, however, be considered in terms of 
meeting material needs as it restricts the understanding of basic human needs, but rather, in terms 




The variable of the role of the state is linked to the previously mentioned factor of meeting basic 
human needs, and of providing security and recognition. Azar points out that countries 
experiencing PSC, have their political power monopolized by one identity group, that uses their 
                                                     
44 Ibid. p 7 
45 Ibid. p 6 
46 Azar (1990), p 9 
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institutional leverage to maintain the balance of power by undermining the minority identity 
groups’ participation, increasing competitive and conflictual attitudes. 
 
International linkages: 
The occurrence of PSC is also based on the internal policies being dictated by international 
linkages; according to Azar international linkages can take two forms: economic dependency and 
client relationships. He argues that there is a direct correlation between states’ economic 
dependence on the wider international economic system and the weakening of their autonomy by 
outside influences--exacerbating denial of access to needs of communal groups by distorting the 
domestic political and economic systems “through the realignment of subtle coalitions of 
international capital, domestic capital and the state capital.”47 Azar defines client relations as a set 
of arrangements whereby a state’s security is guaranteed by an external power on the guarantee of 
loyalty. This nature of international linkages is equally significant in distracting the state from its 
internal responsibilities as it involves some sacrifice of autonomy and independence inducing the 
client state in pursuing domestic and international policies that are disjointed from the needs of its 
populations.48 
 
This is especially true in the case of refugees from Syria in Lebanon. Indeed, refugees from Syria 
are part of three main minority identity groups in Lebanon: Syrian, Palestinian and Muslim. All 
three groups are systematically undermined by the institutional framework, and the socio-political 
history of Lebanon. This in turn resulted in Azar’s prediction regarding the four outcomes of PSCs: 
                                                     
47 Ibid. p 10 
48Ibid.p 11 
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deterioration of physical security, psychological ossification, institutional deformity and increased 
dependency.49 
 
d) Key factors for a successful securitization of refugees 
Therefore, identity groups and membership to those groups are defined in ethno-centric terms. 
Identity becomes framed by the language of security; the “otherness breaches the harmonious inner 
sphere and therefore can introduce the possibility of death; he or she becomes the civil enemy 
placing the entire society in a war-like environment.”50 The mentioned death is perceived as 
representing the dissolution of cultural norms and native identity by the non-native norms and 
customs. According to Huysmans, the securitization of migrants, introduces a foe vs. ally 
dichotomy within the political community.51 This is especially true in deeply divided societies, 
such as Lebanon, where identities are heavily politicized. In our particular case, it is this perception 
of the refugees on which their nation-wide securitization lies. However, for the securitization of 
refugees to take place and for exceptional measures to be put forward, three key factors are 
required: the audience, the context and practices. 
 
First, Edelman argues in favour of the centrality of the audience; indeed, the success of 
securitization depends on the securitizing actor’s ability to identify and instrumentalize the 
audience’s emotions, interests and needs. In other words the securitizing actor needs to construct a 
political spectacle.52 The two groups, the audience and the securitizing actor(s), need to reach a 
common perception of a threat and an accord on how to deal with it; securitization becomes a 
                                                     
49 Ibid. p 15 
50 Huysmans (2000), p 375 
51 Ibid. p 376 
52 Ibid., p78 
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negotiations process. Therefore, the securitizing actor needs to adapt its language to its targeted 
audience and pull on emotional strings or use past experiences, as the securitizing actor’s 
arguments need to resonate with the audience. This act of speaking security does not only rely on 
words, the securitizing actor could use tone, gestures, body language, images and so on.53 The 
securitizing actor therefore engages in an advertisement campaign of sorts to mould the perception 
of the audience and to arouse their interests. The latter is done under an emergency and urgent 
atmosphere, which will help sway attitudes and encourage a mobilization of the targeted 
audience.54  
 
Then comes the role of the context – this core assumption stems from the sociological version of 
securitization inspired by Foucault’s work.55 The success of securitization does indeed rely on the 
audience, however, for the speech acts to echo within the audience and to allow the securitizing 
actor access to unlimited resources and power to tackle the threat at hand, an underlying context, 
or as Balzacq puts it: felicity conditions56, is necessary. Indeed, language is inherently limited in 
its role of creating a new reality, where the us would allow their representatives to act against the 
them. In the words of de Wilde, “words only have a meaning for those who know how to interpret 
them in terms of that which they refer.”57 Consequently, for securitization to be successful it needs 
to occur in a specific environment. 
` 
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Finally, claiming that the success of securitization is only the result of a rational design part of a 
predetermined agenda would be undermining the primordial role of practices.58 Reckwitzes define 
practices as a “routinized type of behaviour which consists of several elements interconnected to 
one another: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, things and their use, a 
background knowledge in the form of understanding and know-how, states of emotion and 
motivational knowledge.”59 Reckwitzes emphasizes how practice theory, in our case securitization, 
applies differently according to the “localization of the social and in their conceptualization of the 
body, mind, things, knowledge (…) and the agent.”60Therefore, if one has to take into account both 
the context and the audience, it also has to emphasize the role of practices, which constitutes the 




The dissertation conceptual framework rests on a sociological approach to securitization; the CSS’ 
shortcomings due to its emphasis on speech acts and lack of focus on the context, have made it 
inadequate to understand the securitization of refugees from Syria in Lebanon. Indeed, the 
emphasis of the CSS limits the intersubjective concepts essential to understand the securitization 
of identity and of refugees; the latter being Foucault’s biopolitics, Arendt’s take on nation-building 
and Azar’s theory of PSC. These concepts emphasize Balzacq’s claim to take a sociological 
approach to better deconstruct the process. The latter conceptual framework rests on three key 
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factors to make securitization possible: the audience, the context and practices. The next chapter 
will explore how those three factors are manifested in the overarching Lebanese context. 
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CHAPTER II – THE CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
To understand the securitization of the 1.3 million refugees from Syria in Lebanon it is important 
to explore Lebanese-Syrian relations, as well as the domestic and international environments. The 
former has enabled a psycho-social and politico-economic context in the latter, which was then 
exacerbated by internal issues inherent to the state of Lebanon, offering a fertile ground in which 
the securitizing actors could use unrestricted and exceptional resources and power to deal with the 
perceived threats of the Syrian refugees. In the case of the Lebanese government, the unrestricted 
power was manifested by being able to not deal with the refugee problem and go against the 
international rights of refugees, as will be explored in chapter three and four.  
 
Additionally, from a study of the context it becomes possible to discern the relevant securitizing 
actors part of the process. This section will argue that the securitizing actors are mainly: the various 
anti-Syrian Lebanese governments, with the most recent one of President Michel Aoun, the 
concerned political parties, and indirectly the UNHCR.  This chapter will fist explore the role of 
the UNHCR in the securitization of refugee communities, it will then gradually narrow down on 
the Lebanese-Syrian contexts that allowed for the rapid securitization of refugees from Syria in 
Lebanon. 
 
A – THE WIDER INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: UNHCR’S INDIRECT ROLE IN 
SECURITIZING REFUGEES 
 
It important to look at the international context, which allowed refugees in general to be subject to 
securitization. When exploring the wider geopolitical environment, unexpected securitizing actors 
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emerge, such as UNHCR within its wider humanitarian efforts to address the growing displacement 
phenomenon.  The UNHCR’s indirect securitization of refugees underlines the central role of 
language in the securitization process. Indeed, since the 1990s, the UNHCR has been inadvertently 
key in enabling the inextricable connection between refugees and security issues. 
 
The UNHCR, with its new mission of putting an emphasis on human security has securitized the 
entirety of the transnational refugee population through the broadcasting of its numerous speeches 
and publishing of annual reports. The UNHCR mention of security relating to refugees was 
obviously a way to emphasize the need to ensure the security of refugees rather than from refugees, 
however, it resulted in the latter rather than the former.61 It can be argued that this trend was first 
initiated under the UN High Commissioner of the time, Sadako Ogato. In October 1994, Ogato 
claimed in one of her first speeches that: “population displacement whether internal or international 
has gone beyond the humanitarian domain to become a major political, security and socio-
economic issue, affecting regional and global stability”62, and that “refugee problems invariably 
affect key state interests. They are related to matters of national, regional and even international 
peace and security.  Humanitarian crises in our times increasingly are strategic crises, although 
they are infrequently dealt with as such.”63  
 
When analysing the organization’s annual reports since the 1970s to the General Assembly, we can 
witness an increase in the frequency of the use of the word “security” and relating terms. Indeed, 
from 1970 to 1986, the term security is hardly mentioned, on average it is used only 3.5 times per 
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report64; the vocabulary used relates more to terms such as “humanitarian issue”, “refugee needs” 
and “humanitarian distress.”65 However, from 1986 to 1987 the mention of security almost triples; 
this trend only increases at the turn of the century and in 2011, it reaches an all time high of an 
average of 38 mentions of words conveying the concept of security. A similar increase can be found 
during the same period of time in the UNHCR’s annual notes on international protection.66 
Therefore, the UNHCR enabled an international framework where the refugees could be 
securitized on regional levels, according to specific contexts, as can be illustrated by the 
securitization of refugees from Syria in Lebanon. 
 
B – THE REGIONAL CONTEXT 
 
i) Lebanese-Syrian relations: 
First, one needs to explore the concept of Greater Syria in order to comprehend the diplomatic 
rollercoaster embodied by Lebanese-Syrian relations. Greater Syria is the region stretching from 
Turkey, to Egypt, and from Iraq to the Mediterranean Sea; therefore, until its declaration of 
independence, Lebanon was an integral part of this semi-territorial empire. The latter was divided 
and re-distributed among the great powers during World War I, under the Sykes Picot agreement 
(1916). 67 The agreement traumatized the region and created a launching pad for the majority of 
the presently conducted conflicts in the Middle East. Lebanon and Syria were given to the French 
and both were mandates; even if the communitarian makeup of the two countries have strike 
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resemblances, their respective experiences under the French was very different.68 This was mainly 
due to the Maronites’ hold on power in Lebanon, whereas in Syria the Muslim majority, the Sunnis, 
had the hold on political power.69 Additionally, the colonial complex of Syrians, who did not 
recognize the authority of the French over what it considered its land, created tensions not only 
with the French, but also with the Lebanese who declared their independence explicitly from the 
French, and implicitly from Syria, in November 1943. Despite its declaration of independence, 
Syria still practiced a neo-colonial policy towards the smaller neighbouring region, as can be seen 
in its active involvement in Lebanese civil war and its aftermath.70 This can be illustrated by the 
fact that the Syrian military forces did not leave Lebanon until 2005, when they were removed 
under heavy international pressure. In order to understand the power leverage Syria has on its 
smaller neighbour, it is important to study the Lebanese civil war.71 
 
i) Lebanese Civil War 
The Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) was the result of a combination of sectarian rivalries and 
external involvement. The Lebanese constitution was based on the 1932 consensus showing that 
the population of the time had a majority of Christian Maronites (54% of the population were 
Christian, 44% were Muslims and the remaining 2% included numerous and different ethnic and 
religious groups)72; therefore, based on this consensus, the governmental powers were distributed. 
The Maronites were given the Presidency, the Sunni the Prime Ministership, while the Speaker of 
the Parliament had to be Shi’a.73 The 1932 national census however was no longer an accurate 
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representation of the sectarian repartition of the country by the mid 1950s, and the confessional 
balance tipped in favour of the Muslims; however this change in demographics was not represented 
in the constitution of the government and policies, which ended creating friction amongst the 
different factions and in the questioning of the legitimacy of the government.74 This, in turn, 
resulted in the beginning of the Maronites’ and the zuama’s (the commercial elite composed of 
both Christians and Muslims) paranoia over the potential loss of their power and advantages.  
 
The alteration in the domestic configuration of the state was coupled with a severe socio-economic 
crisis. The tertiary sector was monopolized by the zuama and the focus on the development of 
services led to a negligence of the inward looking sectors of the economy (i.e. the industry and 
agriculture). This disparity in economic development mirrored the sectarian rift, where certain 
confessions had the most privileges, whereas others were ostracized from economic development.75 
This resulted in a faulty urbanization, leading to the creation of poverty belts around the capital, 
mainly Muslim populated, and the rise of the mahroumeen (the neglected) in the South.76 This 
socio-economic repartition of the society also affected access to education and healthcare, which 
helped reproduce the feudal hierarchy over the years, and increased inter-sectarian grievances. The 
grievances were even more pronounced when clear instances of corruption at the government level 
were taking place, and a system of patronage was established.77  
 
This gradually deepening rift between the different confessional groups were exacerbated by 
international powers for their own benefit, which not only made the outbreak of the war more 
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likely, but it also increased the destructive potential and longevity once the war was initiated in 
1975.78 As mentioned earlier, Syria was a major participant in both the enabling of the war and its 
destructiveness. The Syrian government used their geographical and ethnic proximity to 
manipulate the militias that were formed to benefit their aspirations to regional hegemony. Some 
even argue, that the Lebanese Civil War also served as a Syrian playground to conduct its own 
grievances.79  Its financing and arming of the militias gave them greater political and military 
power, enough for the militias to take on a de-facto governmental position, completely 
marginalizing the state. Indeed, it even led some scholars to claim that the state was now the weaker 
partner of the militias.80 Its interference also created intra-militia violence, which increased the 
level of violence in the territory. The intra-militia violence led to a blurring of the military and 
political objectives, turning the war into a senseless ethnic cleansing of sort – everything needed to 
be done to eliminate the civil enemy, but the definition of who the enemy was became gradually 
less precise through the years. This led to the impossibility of the local authorities to put an end to 
the war, which resulted in the calling for external help to end the hostilities.81  
 
The war ended with the signing of the Ta’if agreement in 1989, calling for the disarmament of all 
militias, except Hezbollah, and establishing a Syrian tutelage of Lebanon to help the war-torn 
country establish a central government.82 The tutelage was supposed to last a couple of years and 
ended up being extended to 2005. The extended stay of the Syrian forces, combined with the 
grievances of the war, led to the emergence of two semi-political parties, who only re-enforced the 
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marginalization of, and paralysis within the state in modern day Lebanon, and illustrates the failure 
of the Ta’if agreement: 8th March (led by Hezbollah; a pro-Syrian coalition) and 14th March (led 
by the Hariri family; against Syrian involvement.)83 Throughout the years, the two camps have 
stagnated the decision-making process of any institutional body and increased sectarian tensions, 
while each group was under the patronage of an external power.84 The continuous Syrian protection 
of Hezbollah was probably the biggest bone of contention in politics, and underlined that even 
though the violence of the civil war stopped, the systematic patronage system, and the root-causes 
of the conflict have never been addressed and are still persisting in modern day Lebanese politics.85  
 
ii) Psycho-social context: 
The psychological environment in which the Lebanese found themselves after years of conflict and 
perceived condescension from the Syrians in regards to the Lebanese population, illustrate the 
relationship between the two civilian populations after years of political and military rivalry.86 The 
Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International affairs conducted a study in the summer 
of 2014 on approximately 2000 Lebanese nationals to quantify the above mentioned psychological 
environment, which underlined, on a limited scale, the perception Lebanese had of Syrian refugees 
when taking into account the Syrian-Lebanese historical relationship. The study came up with the 
following result: 88% see Syrians as taking jobs away from the Lebanese who need them the most; 
82% do not want their family members to marry a Syrian or a Syrian descendent; 63% see the 
monetary aid given to the Syrians since 2011 as money that could be spent on the Lebanese 
population; 72% oppose the Lebanese state’s imposed responsibility of giving a refuge to Syrian 
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refugees, and 51% of the latter are strictly against offering Syrian refugees shelter in the previously 
established Palestinian camps; 58% mistrust Syrians; 71% believe that the gradual increase of 
Syrian refugees in Lebanon will eventually result in the resurgence of another inter-confessional 
conflict; 67% are persuaded that the Syrian refugee presence will inevitably lead to a second civil 
war.87  
 
This psychological context is also a result of the previous experiences the Lebanese nationals had 
with Palestinian refugees from 1948, to the present days. Indeed, the nakba of 1948 has led over 
213,000 Palestinians to seek refuge in Lebanon, and today the Palestinian refugees amount to over 
489,000 individuals.88 This previous experience with refugees has been quite a negative one, 
especially after the PLO’s migration from Jordan to Lebanon in 197089, which resulted in the 
Palestinians involvement in the civil war and in their characterization as “refugee warriors.”90 The 
PLO’s re-settlement in Lebanon found a fertile ground for recruitment in Palestinian camps, which 
helped them conduct their fight against Israel.91 Indeed, the Palestinian refugees were not allowed 
to have working permits--meaning that they were physically, politically, socially and economically 
marginalized from the entire society, leading to the materialization of a quasi-state within those 
camps.  
 
The PLO offered employment, salaries and protection; the increasing number of refugee warriors 
exposed Lebanon to military threats due to the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli war.92 For instance, the 
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PLO were conducting retaliatory raids against Israel, which led to a cross-border offensive led by 
Ariel Sharon in 1982, which in turn led to the sieging of Beirut and to an insurgency in the south 
where the Israeli ended up retreating and staying for 18 years.93 The insurgency resulted in more 
than 12,000 casualties and in the Shi’a-oriented radicalisation of the south led by Hezbollah, 
creating tensions at the governmental level as explored previously.94 The PLO was also blamed for 
the murder of Bachir Gemayel, former president and leader of the Kateab, two weeks after his 
presidential election. The Palestinians were however wrongfully accused, but still paid the price as 
the Kataeb sent troops in the camps of Sabra and Chatila and massacred over 2000 refugees.95  
 
The study of Lebanese attitudes toward Syrians cited above was conducted in 2014, before certain 
events, such as the suicide bombing in Beirut on November 12th 2015 (which increases the fear of 
terrorists coming in Lebanon through the flow of refugees) and before the garbage crisis that started 
in July 2015. When taking these factors into account, it could be argued that the percentage of those 
with negative attitudes toward Syrians shown in the study would probably have been higher.  
 
iii) The environmental crisis: 
Today, more than 5.9 million people are living in less than 10452 km2 territory, of which 21% is 
mountainous and inhabitable; this means that there are 540 persons per km2.96 Therefore, taking 
into account the density of the demographics, and the failure of the Lebanese government waste 
management program, Syrian refugees do become security threats for the environmental sector, 
not because they are refugees, or because they are Syrian, but because of the overpopulation, which 
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increases risk concerning health and the environmental sustainability, and greatly affects 
Lebanon’s development. The increase in population density has resulted in Lebanon being ranked 
at number 16 on the world population density index (previously 21).97 Such increase results in 
environmental and social impediments for the host country, including but not limited to, increases 
in: waste generation, water and sanitation problems, use of vehicles, pollution and crowds.98  
 
In 2015, with the large presence of Syrian refugees, the waste level of the country reached the 
levels it should have been at in 2055.99 It is estimated that the refugees have produced an additional 
40,000 tons of waste per year ever since 2012 leading to a proportional increase in incremental 
pollution. The increase level of waste has led to phenomena such as open dumping and open 
burning.100 Indeed, 52% of the waste is disposed in existing open dumps, which increases the 
chances of land, water and soil contamination.101 This resulted in authorities burning waste, which 
increases the level of carbon dioxide in the oxygen; consequently, the land, the water and the air’s 
pollution are increasing at a terrifying pace.  
 
The fact that so much waste is in open space leads to a 22% increase of the risk of being exposed 
to diseases.102 This risk has been heightened throughout the previous years to a staggering 39% due 
to the fact that Syrian refugees were more exposed to the open dumps because of their status and 
their lack of shelter resulting in diseases being spread more widely and rapidly throughout the 
territory.103 Refugees need for water has led to a corresponding 8-12% national water demand, 
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resulting in a grave depletion of water resources and water quality, which will result in, again higher 
health related risks, which in the long run affect not only the Lebanese population, its wildlife and 
ecosystem (plants, animals both on land and at sea), but more severely the already impoverished 
refugee communities.104 Finally, the influx of refugees has also impacted the electrical capacity 
and consumption of the host country; prior to the Syrian refugee arrival, Lebanon already couldn’t 
answer the national demand for electricity, leading to a necessary procuration of private generators 
in residential areas. The acquisition of private generators has increased with the arrival of over a 
million refugees, and proportionally, the emission of nitrogen dioxide has augmented by 10%.105  
 
This environmental catastrophe has only worsened since the beginning of July 2015, when the 
Lebanese garbage crisis erupted. The crisis is mainly due the fact that garbage management is still 
conducted by private actors, who have a political agenda of creating friction within the government, 
which led to the termination of their contract.106 It was also the result of the fact that garbage was 
dumped in one specific area in the north of the country; the citizens prohibited access to the area 
as they could no longer take the smell and, the burden and risks that came with the poor 
management of waste.107 The garbage crisis has also created a peaceful uprising in Lebanon, where 
the population were not only protesting for their right to health and security but also against the 
corrupt Parliament, which keeps prolonging its term, undermining the already fragile democracy 
and heightening societal tensions.108 
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The analysis of the context provides a better understanding of the Lebanese nationals acceptance 
of the securitizing actor’s speech acts. From this brief analysis of the context it became possible to 
identify the key securitizing actors; the latter are: the UNCHR, the current anti-Syrian Lebanese 
government led by Michel Aoun (elected in October 2016), and the different political factions that 
first emerged during the civil war. Indeed, the heritage of the civil war, coupled with the evolution 
and deepening of existing grievances translated in the modern-day constitution of the Lebanese 
political, societal and cultural infrastructures has given the relevant securitizing actors virtually 
unlimited resources and the ability to navigate outside normal politics to undermine the threat of 
refugees. This is translated in the government’s refusal to adhere to the only international treaty 
directly tackling the issue of refugees, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and in 
the resulting policies in the region and domestically deployed to govern, control and ostracize the 
large refugee population.  
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CHAPTER III – THE AFTERMATH OF SECURITIZATION: HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS AND PROTECTION GAPS 
 
The lack of structure and the continuous efforts of the Lebanese government to ostracize the refugee 
populations through the years have led to a number of protection gaps and human rights violations. 
Ironically, the refugee population from Syria is not the only victim of such a systemic abuse 
resulting from the institutionalized securitizing process. Indeed, the very community and interests 
the securitizing policies were meant to protect, are jeopardized, creating a flawed sense of security. 
This chapter will be divided two parts.  
 
The first part will explore the legal framework that has made the securitization possible in the first 
place. Indeed, Lebanon is not a signatory state to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(1951), which has allowed the state to develop an intricate domestic administrative and legal 
system to govern and control refugees, such as the establishment of the Memorandum of 
Understanding built upon the previous Bilateral Agreement with Syria (1994).  
 
The second part will explore the human rights abuses and protection gaps resulting from the 
securitization policies. It will argue that it is the no policy policy that has allowed both the host 
community and the refugee community to be exposed to various protection gaps and human rights 
abuses. These abuses and gaps include: the right to security, freedom of movement, the right to 
health and the right to education. While some will argue that the Lebanese government is guilty of 
violating more human rights articles (ex: the right to work), this chapter will put forward the fact 
that, unfortunately, the Lebanese government is not party to any treaty that would make it a legal 
obligation for the government to take positive actions to ensure the full fulfilment of those rights. 
 40 
Moreover, it is important to underline that rights such as the right to work, are not customary 
international law109, meaning that it is hard to prove that they are legally binding, or that the 




I – THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
i) The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and the Additional Protocol 
(1967): 
 
It can be argued that the phenomenon of securitizing refugees in Lebanon started well before the 
arrival of the Syrian refugees on the Lebanese territory in 2011. Indeed, in 1951, the Lebanese 
government refused to sign or ratify the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (CRSR’51) 
and the additional protocol of 1967.110  
 
The CSRS’51 is, to this date, the key international law instrument put in place to deal with the 
phenomenon of transnational forced immigration; it not only lays out the framework for refugee 
rights and the obligations of host states to protect them, it also gives jurisdiction to UNHCR to 
operate and provide humanitarian relief in the signatory countries hosting refugees. The core 
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obligation of the treaty is the concept of non-refoulement, which prohibits returning asylum-
seekers to the country he or she is fleeing due to life-threatening persecution.111 While this notion 
of non-refoulement is a direct responsibility of the signatory states, today, the concept has become 
settled state practice, making it customary international law, and hence legally enforceable.112 
 
The additional protocol of 1967, created January 31st 1967 in New York City, was put in place as 
a way to adapt to the changing times, to remove the restrictive temporal and geographic 
characteristics of refugees as stated in the 1951 Convention.113 Indeed, when the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees was drafted, the majority of refugees were of European origin 
and were mainly refugees in European countries. As the phenomenon of decolonization and 
transnational refugees – or even as we are seeing today, intercontinental refugees – grew, it became 
primordial to re-define what constitutes a refugee, his or her rights and the hosting states’ 
responsibilities regarding this alarmingly growing community. Consequently, the additional 
protocol of 1967 is part of the United Nations’ efforts to make the Convention relating to the rights 
of refugees (1951) universal, and legally enforceable regardless of the geo-temporal constrictions 
inherent to the international system.114 
 
The rhetoric behind the Lebanese government’s refusal to sign or ratify either document was 
influenced by the Palestinian refugee problem within the Lebanese territories. Indeed, the majority 
of the domestic and regional parties agreed to not be part of the International Convention but for 
different reasons. Two main arguments stood forward: first, the Arab countries – mainly Egypt 
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because of the leadership position it wanted to earn in the 1950s in regards to the Middle East – 
were pressuring the Lebanese government, which was hosting a large number of Palestinian 
refugees, to not be part of what they saw as an imperialist decree that would only reduce the validity 
of the Palestinian right of return to their land, and therefore constituted a European play to 
strengthen Israel.115 The ratifying of either document would undermine the temporary nature of 
Palestinian refugees by making them indirectly permanent residents in Lebanon, due to the 
continuous Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is interesting to note that Egypt signed the CSR51 in May 
1981.116 Then, the less mediatized domestic argument was that Lebanon was a country with a 
majority population of Christians, making the arrival of Palestinians, who for the large majority 
were of Sunni confession, a threat to the stability of the established constitutional balance of power. 
Moreover, in the 1950s, and well into the 1960s, Lebanon was undergoing a period of socio-
economic prosperity, and the government saw the influx of refugees as a burden to the continuous 
development of said prosperity. 117 
 
While Lebanon has undergone a number of transformative events, such as the fifteen years-long 
civil war or the change in demographics, it can be argued that those arguments are still the drivers 
of their current policy, or “no policy” policy when dealing with the Syrian refugees. Lebanon has 
still not ratified either document, despite the fact that it is hosting one of the largest refugee 
populations in the region, and it has the highest concentration of refugees per-capita worldwide. 
 
ii) The Bilateral Agreement with Syria (1994) 
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The bilateral agreement between Syrian and Lebanon signed in 1994 includes the monitoring and 
conditions of Syrian nationals entry in Lebanon. Under the agreement, it is stipulated that nationals 
from either country can enter freely enter the counterpart, without a visa, only by showing a 
Lebanese or Syrian national identity card or document.118 This agreement is still in place, however, 
due to the large influx of Syrian nationals since 2011, the Lebanese government has taken steps to 
establish temporary resident permits for Syrian immigrants seeking asylum in Lebanon, as will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
 
iii) The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
 
As a result of the absence of a comprehensive national refugee law in Lebanon, a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) was signed and ratified by both the Lebanese government and the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) in September 2003.119 This MoU puts 
down a framework to deal with the phenomenon of transnational forced migration; one of the main 
mechanisms resulting from this Memorandum is the issuing of residence permits to the asylum 
seekers. These permits are renewable and are usually issued for a duration of three to six months. 
However, in 2013, due to the dire circumstances, the possibility of extending the duration of the 
permits to nine-months was introduced.120 This mechanism was seen as allowing UNHCR a 
window to re-settle the refugees in question in other countries, where their stay will be more 
durable. 
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The domestic legislation that governs refugees in Lebanon is essentially the Law Regulating the 
Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Lebanon, and their Exit from the Country established in 1962.121 
The articles of the law relevant to the recent situation in Lebanon are: Article 26, 31 and 32.122 All 
three lay out the judicial and political rights of foreigners in Lebanon; mainly that a foreigner that 
is being persecuted by a non-Lebanon government, authority or organization can seek political 
asylum in the country without the fear of being expelled or deported back to the country or region 
where his life or freedom are not secured.123 However, the latter also stipulate that a political 
refugee can be convicted for a crime by the Lebanese government, which could result in a fine or 
in his or her illegal imprisonment for up to 3 months.124 
 
Additionally, since January 5th 2015, instructions regarding the entry of Syrians in Lebanon have 
been incorporated and published by the General Directorate of General Security.125 These 
instructions dictate and assign different lengths of stay and require the procuring of different 
supporting documents depending on the nature of the stay (ex: studies, tourism, medical treatment, 
work etc.) These instructions stipulate verbatim that “no Syrian shall be permitted to enter as   a 
refugee save in exceptional circumstances as shall be determined in coordination with the Ministry 
of Social affairs (…) Syrians previously registered as refugees will be allowed to re-enter if they 
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meet the conditions set out in this memorandum.”126 Moreover, only individuals holding UNHCR 
refugee certificates will be considered when applying as a refugee in Lebanon. In addition to those 
restrictions to acquiring the status, when a Syrian national ends up as a refugee, he or she will not 
have the right to seek employment, unless it is directly sponsored by a company operating in 
Lebanon, if he or she wants to apply or renew the temporary residence permits.127 It is also 
stipulated that the Syrian nationals wanting to set foot in the Lebanese territory must have a rental 
agreement from their landlord before applying for the temporary residence visa.128 These 
instructions do not mention anything about the renewal process, but they do mention that Syrian 
refugees are granted a 24 hours stay if they are traveling through Lebanese seaports or airports.129 
 
This legal and administrative framework meant to govern over minorities that represent a threat to 
the status quo have allowed the government to take little, yet drastic, measures to minimize the 
impact of the heavy refugee flow in Lebanon. The government has adopted a no policy policy, 
embodied by the lack of camps and infrastructure (institutional or physical) to help absorb the 1.3 
million refugees from Syria. This has in turn resulted in major human rights abuses and security 
concerns for both the refugees and the Lebanese hosting communities. 
 
II – HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND PROTECTION GAPS 
 
i) “No policy” policy: 
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This laissez faire of the Lebanese authorities regarding the phenomenon of refugees, and more 
recently Syrian refugees, has led to unwillingness to allow formal camps for Syrian refugees. 
Indeed, from early on, the government adopted a no camps policy.130 This decision was heavily 
influenced by the previous Palestinian refugee camps experience set up by the UN and UNRWA 
(United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East), where the 
community created a parallel system, which the Lebanese government, and security forces had no 
authority over.131 Moreover, as mentioned, refugee camps in Lebanon bring back the traumatizing 
events of the Sabra and Shatila massacres in 1982.132  
 
The official statement regarding the government’s reluctance to set up formal UN refugee camps 
is that these camps hinder the opportunities of the displaced communities, as they create a vicious 
cycle of reliance on relief and humanitarian assistance provided in this kind of infrastructure, which 
hamper their ability, and willingness, to seek opportunities outside camp environments.133 
Furthermore, other arguments justifying the lack of formal refugee camps echo the arguments put 
forward when refusing to sign the CSRS’51, mainly that camps will not allow the humanitarian 
situation to be temporary, and that camps creates the risk of the refugee population to become 
permanent residents, and often illegal immigrants in Lebanon.134 
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As a result of this policy of not establishing formal UNHCR camps, the Syrian refugee population 
is now living scattered into 1700 communities across the country.135 More than 65% are residing 
in the Bekaa Valley in de-facto camps where they rent their tents for 100 dollars a month. These 
de-facto camps are not designed to host a community this large and cannot accommodate them in 
terms of infrastructure (ex: not enough water, no sewage system etc.)136 The remaining 35% of the 
refugee population from Syria are split between residing in previously established Palestinian 
camps and in the streets or in inhabited or unfinished buildings around the capital and in the 
south.137 The majority of the Palestinian refugee in Syria that were forced to come to Lebanon due 
to the circumstances in their previous host country are residing in already established Palestinian 
camps.138 
 
a) The Right to Security: 
 
As mentioned, Lebanon is a signatory of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which 
includes the right to security for any person on the member states’ territory. Indeed, Article 3 of 
the Declaration explicitly states: 
 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.139 
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The inadequate monitoring of the refugee population in Lebanon has resulted in increasing the 
vulnerability of the population; it has exposed them to various kinds of violence, especially due to 
the inherent tensions between the host country’s population and the refugees from Syria.140 Indeed, 
tensions rose after the large influx of refugees in 2011, especially since the refugees have settled 
in underdeveloped regions of the country, where the conditions of the Lebanese populations were 
close to the universal standards of poverty. The most shocking event that illustrates the lack of 
protection of refugees was the setting of fire to various informal de-facto camps in 2014, in the 
Bekaa region.141 Moreover, refugees have been subjected to violence from Lebanese law 
enforcement, from torture to illegal and unjustified detention. Due to the increase in criminality 
since 2011, the Lebanese authorities have been given the power to detain and interrogate migrants 
– registered or unregistered – for 72 hours before telling them why they have been arrested; many 
accounts report vicious tactics of torture during the interrogations.142 
 
b) Freedom of movement: 
 
A consequence of the lack of security is the obstruction of the refugees’ freedom of movement in 
Lebanon. Indeed, Article 12(1) of Universal Declaration of Human Rights claims that: 
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state143 
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However, the increasing number of unregistered refugees and of the complex visa application and 
residency system resulting in many refugees lacking the relevant residency permits have led to an 
impediment of the refugee’s freedom of movement. This fear of being caught resulted in the 
majority of the community being clustered in one region limiting their access to essential services 
such as registering with the UNHCR, especially since the increased ad hoc checkpoints throughout 
the country and the right of law enforcement officers to search a person or a vehicle.144 Threats of 
refoulement and long-term detention are still looming over the unregistered refugees’ heads.145 
Additionally, their freedom of movement is heavily restricted by the lack of economic resources to 
cover the transportation costs, which indirectly renders them unable to go to: school, hospitals, 
UNHCR monitored regions or governmental offices. This leads to the denial of not only the 
refugee’s rights to security and to movement, but also their rights to education, work and health. 
 
The Lebanese population’s right to security is also violated as a result of the securitization of 
refugees from Syria. Indeed, the exclusion of the refugee population from the economy, politics 
and social sectors have created a vicious cycle of criminality and violence against Lebanese 
nationals.146 In 2015, criminality rates in and around Beirut have increased by 62%, most of them 
involving drugs and human trafficking targeted towards women and children. Crimes, such as the 
kidnapping of Lebanese nationals for ransoms or to sell organs on the black market have become 
more and more common in Lebanon, and does not only affect remote areas but also the city 
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centre.147 For example, from 2013 to 2015, 460 kidnappings have been reported to the Lebanese 
authorities.148 
 
Moreover, in 1981, the United Nations put forward the Convention on the Elimination of all forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), due to the contemporary recognition that for gender 
equality to be institutionalized, the international community had to recognize that a number of 
concepts and rights had to be put forward to ensure the bridging of the gender gap and to establish 
equality between men and women.149 This is especially important in situations of forced 
displacement where women and girls become increasingly exposed to violent abuses, and where 
discrimination is more likely to occur. General Comment 23 of the convention explicitly mentions 
the need to protect women from sexual-based offences: 
 
Under the Convention, States parties’ obligations to prevent, investigate and punish trafficking 
and sexual and gender based violence are reinforced by international criminal law (…) sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of 
sexual violence of comparable gravity may constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity or 
an act of torture, or constitute an act of genocide (…) sexual violence must also be interpreted 
consistently with the Convention and other internationally recognized human rights 
instruments150 
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However, the no policy policy of the Lebanese authorities regarding the large influx of Syrian 
nationals in Lebanon have led to an increase in the phenomena of: sexual violence against mostly 
Syrian women, sex trafficking, increase in child marriage and prostitution. More than 56% of the 
refugees fleeing Syria to Lebanon are of female gender, and the average age is 21151; this coupled 
with the lack of camps, and hence the lack of surveillance and protection from UNHCR, has 
rendered women and girls vulnerable to gender-based violence, especially when the refugees are 
in transit trying to reach the host country or even within the country. Indeed, the United State’s 
Trafficking in Persons Report (2016) Lebanon is now ranked 9th on the list of the countries source 
of the most trafficked women, whereas in 2014 it was ranked 16th.152 Additionally, Reuters reported 
that 1 in 5 Syrian refugee women is forced into prostitution for financial survival, and 1 in 3 has 
suffered from some kind of sexual abuse; most of those women are between the age of 16 and 
28.153 While the data is less concrete on this issue, UNHCR has also reported that due to the lack 
of infrastructure to support the influx of refugees from Syria, Palestinian and Syrian women are 
coerced into providing sexual favours to secure access to food, shelter or employment.154   
 
In the case of Syrian or Palestinian girls forced into child marriage, UNHCR has confirmed that it 
has become a growing trend in Lebanon.155 While heavily contested, the minimum legal age of 
marriage in Lebanon is 14 years old156; Syrian refugee families often use the established legal 
framework as a way: to lift the economic burden of seeking refuge in the neighbouring country, to 
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protect her from future sexual harassment and to ensure the economic security of their child.157 The 
partaking in child marriage has become for many a survival strategy. However, the girl who has 
been sold into marriage is exposed to greater risks of: domestic violence, sexual exploitation, 
complicated pregnancies, and inability to exit the marriage if she wishes to do so – both due to 
cultural norms and the lack of legal aid provided.158 The notion of consent is at the centre of this 
dilemma, where if blurred, the practice could be considered as slavery or human trafficking through 
marriage where the girl who is married becomes a commodity for both her parents and her future 
husband.159  
 
This growing trend of sexual violence against women has increasingly affected Lebanese women 
as well. Indeed, since the closing of the border in 2015 as an effort to stop the refugee flow, the 
number of refugee women has stagnated, making the pool of potential trafficked women smaller; 
therefore, Lebanese women from the hosting villages have become the prime targets of the 
traffickers.160 Additionally, in the past five years, the volume of sexual crimes reported has tripled; 
some trace back this increase in violence against women to the recent influx of male refugees from 
Syria.161 While it would be ignorant to claim that all refugees are predators, it is important to 
underline that the conditions within which the refugees found themselves after their forced 
migration, the violence they experienced at home and the mental-health consequences of the Syrian 
war on its population, creates a conducive environment for violence against women.162 
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c) The Right to Health: 
Another major consequence of the open setting within which the refugees found themselves in after 
their settlement in Lebanon, is related to health conditions. Lebanon has signed and ratified the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights in 1966. The latter Covenant explicitly 
stipulates the right to health, which includes: safe drinking water and adequate sanitation, safe food, 
adequate nutrition and housing, healthy working and environmental environments, and gender 
equality in the fulfilling of the right.163 
 
A number of obstacles arise when it comes to the fulfilment of the right to health of refugees, 
mainly: the incapacity to access healthcare services, the inability to cover all fees, and the current 
environmental crisis in the host country.  
 
In Lebanon, refugees are scattered and mostly reside in urban environments, which poses major 
challenges for health interventions164; it also makes access to hospitals extremely difficult. Indeed, 
if there were to be camps, a comprehensive and central system could be designed to ensure health 
services and monitoring.165 The lack of movement due to the fear of being arrested has led the 
refugees to not seek medical help.166 In addition to their reluctance, and sometimes inability to 
reach hospitals or healthcare facilities, the burden of payments is also a huge factor in the 
compromising of the right to health of refugees. Even though UNHCR covers some of the hospital 
costs for registered refugees, they do not cover them all. 167 
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Furthermore, the current environmental crisis in Lebanon is continuously threatening the health of 
refugees and Lebanese equally. Indeed, the increase in the population density, and the garbage 
crisis has resulted in a level of pollution that Lebanon was estimated to reach in 2055. The two 
combined makes the context prone to large-scale outbreaks of diseases. The lack of surveillance 
and monitoring of refugees and the fact that they are often informally living alongside the Lebanese 
population make it even harder to contain the passing of diseases within the region.168 Moreover, 
the garbage crisis has affected water and food supplies, which makes the refugees in de-facto camps 
particularly vulnerable. Indeed, in formal camps, UNHCR would ensure that the sewage system 
and the water supplies are completely separate for the former to not affect the latter, or compromise 
the food supply (ex: through washing vegetables).169 However, the lack of formal camps combined 
with the unsanitary impacts of the open dumps and garbage crisis in Lebanon on crop-based foods, 
meat and water, has left the refugees from Syria exposed to health issues with no real access to 
quality medical assistance.170 
 
Finally, a large majority of the refugees from Syria have undergone severe traumas and have 
witnessed, and have been victims of atrocities. This added to the daily stresses of living as a refugee 
(ex: trying to secure food and water, or knowing where to sleep) resulted in a growing population 
suffering from mental health issues.171 It is common to find symptoms of severe anxiety, 
depression, withdrawal, and insomnia amongst the large refugee population. Often mental health 
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is not prioritized due to the limits of budgets and to the stigma in the region.172 Indeed, in Lebanon 
medical services to treat mental health-related issues are mostly private and very expensive, 
therefore refugees heavily rely on the local and international NGOs. Refugees tend to not prioritize 
it due to more important economic demands, such as feeding their family and paying rent. While a 
certain number of NGOs (the World Health Organization and UNICEF) have mobilized and 
partnered with the Lebanese Health ministry, which has resulted in the set up of 60 agencies 
training medical personal – from doctors to social workers – to provide help for refugees suffering 
any mental illness, the burden of the stigma surrounding mental health issues remains the biggest 
obstacle.173 Either refugees do not realize they need help, as they are uneducated on the risks or 
even the sickness, or they chose not to as they fear being labelled as mad, being ostracized, and not 
being able to work and cover expenses.174 
 
The failure to address those problems does not only have repercussions on the neglected refugee 
population, but also on Lebanon and Syria, as in the long term it would have socio-economic effects 
on both societies, as it could result in: dropping out early from school, difficulty to maintain a job, 
homelessness and the inability to form relationships and of taking care of their children – putting 
them at risk as well.175 If mental health conditions are left untreated, especially amongst the young 
population, this could lead to a “lost generation.”176 Indeed, the International Medical Corps (IMC), 
the organization who provides psychological support for Syrian refugees in their various host 
                                                     






countries, including Lebanon, has stated that individuals with untreated mental health issues are at 
risk of no longer being able to function in any given society.177   
 
d) The Right to Education: 
The Right to Education is most important when related to the development of children; indeed, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) of 1990 has been created to ensure the full most 
beneficial path for children.178 While the CRC and the rights under the convention overlap with 
many treaties and their articles, such as the UDHR or CEDAW, it directly tackles protection gaps 
that would in theory help in times of displacement. For instance, the two sub sections of Article 32 
of the CRC stipulate that: 
 
State parties recognize the right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation and from 
performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to 
be harmful to the child’s heath or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development (…) 
States parties shall take legislative, administrative, social and education measures to ensure the 
implementation of the prevent article179  
 
Children of forced displacement in developing countries often found themselves exposed to forced 
labour, or slavery-like labour as a way to contribute and help in covering the economic burden.180 
In Lebanon, Syrian nationals have always had the right to work; however, their access to the job 
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market has been severely diminished since the Syrian uprising, which limits the ability of Syrian 
families to provide an education for their children. Indeed, in December 2014, the Minister of 
Labour reduced the number of professions open to Syrians, which mirrors the restrictions imposed 
on Palestinian refugees.181 Syrian refugees are consequently no longer able to seek high positions 
in the medical, legal and teaching fields. In addition, the office of General Security issued a 
statement in April 2015 claims that for a Syrian refugee to have the right to work, the employer 
must be “actively seeking to secure a work permit”182 and to obtain a secure work visa from the 
Minister of Labour.183 
 
Therefore, most of the professional opportunities offered to refugees are low skilled and low paid 
jobs (ex: construction, service); to this obstacle is added the fact that more than 56% of the refugees 
currently in Lebanon are not registered with UNHCR, and are therefore more likely to be exploited 
by the Lebanese employers, resulting in even lower pay and in dangerous work conditions. This 
has led to the need of children participating in generating revenues to help make ends meet.184  
 
In 2015, Reuters reported that according to the Freedom Fund, and NGO that fights against modern 
slavery, more than 70% of Syrian Refugee Children are forced into full-time exploitative Child 
labour by the age of 5. This in turn has led to a steep decline in Syrian refugee education.185 The 
Human Rights Watch Report on Lebanon’s (2015) figures show that out of 500,000 Syrian 
children, only 158,321 are receiving a school-taught education, meaning that less than 1 in 5 Syrian 
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refugee under the age of 18 is enrolled in school.186 This is not only due to the economic demands 
of being a refugee in Lebanon but also to the Lebanese government’s intentional barriers to 
providing education to Syrian children. Several factors deprive Syrian refugee children of their 
right to education: the lack of compliance in implementing the enrolment policy, limiting school 
ratios, insufficient funding and support for children of forced migration in adapting to the 
curriculum, lack of available space, transportation costs and the cultural bullying and ostracizing 
of Syrian children in Lebanese schools.187 
 
i) Non compliance in implementing the education policy: 
UNICEF states that the irregularities in the implementation of Lebanon’s enrolment policy is one 
of the main reasons impeding of Syrian families from enrolling their children in school.188 
According to the local guidelines, public schools only require an identification document, two-
passport sized photographs for each child, and previous school certificates. However, on the 
ground, it has been reported that directors have been asking Syrian families to provide additional 
papers, such as proof of valid residency or health records, or pay school fees although enrolment 
in public schools are free of charge.189 These additional requirements are almost impossible for the 
large majority of Syrian families to meet, especially since a large number of Syrian refugees are 
not legally registered and because of the way they fled their home, which in almost every case 
results in the lack of the required records. In addition to those hurdles prior to entry, Syrian refugee 
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children could also face complications once in, as the board of direction of schools have the right 
to expel children without any explanation.190 
 
ii) School ratios and quotas: 
Another implicit restriction to access to education for Syrian refugee children is the scarcity of the 
availability of second shifts. According to the Lebanese Ministry of Education, second shift policy, 
schools will only open a class for grades 1 through 6 if there is a demand from at least 25 students, 
and of 20 students for the grades 7 through 9.191 This has become increasingly complicated since 
fewer Syrian children continue to get an education past grade 5, resulting in insufficient numbers 
of students to open upper grade classes, which in turn leads to Syrian students having to repeat the 
lower grades classes or opting out of school.192 
 
A quota policy also governs whether the entire second shift at a given school remains open; under 
the Lebanese second shift policy, if less than 250 Syrians enrol in the second shift school, the 
program could close, which requires Syrians to find new schools even during the middle of the 
school year.193 This is made increasingly difficult since the establishment of an additional ratio 
within the first shift classes, which impose a maximum of one to one ratio of Lebanese to non-
Lebanese students in each class. Moreover, Syrian refugee children are also facing a lack of space 
in Lebanese public schools, despite almost 50,000 unused seats in 2015, because schools that do 
have space are not located in the areas of need, and as mentioned, the freedom of movement of 
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Syrian refugee families is restricted in the host country – due to transportation costs or fear of 




In 2015, and for the past ten years the Ministry of Education had a budget of around $300,000,000 
despite the fact that the population of children in Lebanon has almost doubled due to the refugee 
crisis.195 Additionally, municipalities throughout the country are given the same budget for 
education services, which creates disproportions as some are hosting more refugees while others 
are hosting none.196 These restrictions in funding and support hinder the educational development 
of the children, who sometime chose to stop their education and work. This in turn results in a high 
number of unqualified and unskilled workers; for instance, the two municipalities hosting the most 
refugees, Bekaa and Akkar, have the highest percentage of out of school children of secondary 
school age – 81% and 79% respectively.197 
 
This is not only detrimental to the Syrian refugee child population, but also to the Lebanese 
children, and the larger Lebanese population. Indeed, in some instances, classes can have up to 55 
children in one class, meaning that the quality of education has severely decreased in places where 
it was not very high to begin with due to the remote location of certain villages. Indeed, the 
obstacles to the fulfilment of the right to education of refugees stemming from a number of 
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obstacles, such as funding, also obstructs and violates the right of education of the Lebanese 
children.198 For instance, at the end of 2014, UNICEF estimated that the number of future illiterate 




The legal and administrative apparatus deployed to control refugees on the Lebanese territory has 
allowed for grave abuses victimizing both the refugees and the national populations. Indeed, the 
Lebanese government’s refusal to ratify the Convention, and the established policies regarding 
individuals from Syria entering the Lebanese territory has allowed for a “no policy” policy 
approach to refugee management. The latter is translated on the ground by the lack of formal 
refugee camps, which in turns leads to violations of multiple human rights rights (i.e. the right to 
security, freedom of movement, the right to health and the right to education) under conventions, 
declarations and covenants that Lebanon did adhere to. This freedom in interpreting the moral and 
legal requirements of the refugee frameworks, and the discrepancies in providing protection can 
lead us to ask whether or not the international framework is inherently doomed, and thus obsolete 
in dealing and managing large refugee flows. 
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CHAPTER 4 – A DOOMED REFUGEE PROTECTION FRAMEWORK? (PART I) 
THE LIMITS OF THE REFUGEE CONVENTION 
 
To understand the securitization of transnational forced displacement, it is important to explore the 
limits and incoherencies in the current international refugee framework; the discrepancies of the 
institutionalized resettlement process and protection of the displaced has made it possible to 
characterize refugees as threats to the host countries. Indeed, the current framework of forced 
migration has been under scrutiny since the turn of the millennium, as refugee crises seem to have 
elongated and intensified. The main criticism of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, drafted by the United Nations, is that it is anachronistic. The geopolitical scene is heavily 
defined by the heritage of the Cold War, whereas the Convention was drafted in a world 
characterized by the consequences of the Second World War, making it outdated and 
geographically restricted. This debate over the limits of the refugee framework has led to the 
questioning of the validity of the current convention regarding the status and rights of refugees in 
host countries. Indeed, scholars are putting forward proposals for a re-drafting of the Convention, 
or for a complete dismissal of the existing framework. 
 
This part of the dissertation will first lay down the core limits of the framework, including: the 
definition of a refugee, the omnipresent inconsistencies and discrepancies in practice and in theory, 
the absence and contention of an exit strategy (i.e. resettlement of refugees to their country of 
origin), and the different and changing migration channels taken by refugees. It will conclude that 
despite the inherent flaws of the CRSR’51, its re-drafting or dismissal will not be advantageous for 
the community of transnational forced migrants due to the realist nature of the international 
community. Instead of the drastic proposal of creating a new refugee protection framework, this 
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chapter will put forward the potential role and benefits of development actors in helping refugees 
in protracted situations, in first countries of asylum.  
 
a) The definition 
 
The primary criticism concerning the current Convention Relating on the Status of Refugees is the 
fact that the definition of refugees no longer fits the modern forced migration flows, leaving out 
some persecuted groups. Indeed, the Convention’s definition of a refugee is based on the Jewish 
refugee influx during and after the Second World War.200 Consequently, the definition is a product 
of 1950s Western and European powers; the definition is temporally and geographically limited 
making it inadequate to characterize the current refugee flows. The Article 1 of the Convention 
defines refugees as: 
 
A person who, owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group of political opinion, is outside the country of 
his nationality, and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country201 
 
The modern flows of forced migration differ from the above-mentioned definition in both nature 
and longevity.202 Indeed, the definition is characterized by many as being too narrow, and therefore 
does not include many social groups that are in need of international protection; hence, not every 
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person who is a refugee is covered by the Convention. For instance, many of the refugees have 
been forced to migrate due to phenomenon such as: civil wars, persecution by non-state groups 
(ex: gangs, terrorist groups, drug cartels), climate change, domestic violence or persecution based 
on a person’s lack of right to exit a group (ex: targeted violence due to non-adherence to cultural 
norms, such as female circumcision).203 The UN tried to address this gap in the convention by 
introducing the Additional Protocol of 1967, which aims at amending the temporal and 
geographical limits of the definition of a refugee as to make it wider and more inclusive.204 
However, the issues of the Convention and its protocol are not limited to the definition of refugees. 
 
a) The proposed solutions:  
 
The definition of a refugee, which is at the core of the convention, can also become problematic as 
some may argue it leads to asking the wrong questions.205 By focusing on defining who is a refugee, 
little attention is given to the mechanisms that should be put in place to alleviate the tragedy of 
becoming a refugee.  While neither the Convention nor protocol of 1967 directly addresses the root 
causes of refugee flows, which creates a permanent obstacle in the forced migration framework, 
there has been very little contestation in extending the definition of refugees. It is the proposed 
solutions to deal with refugee crises that have been the most problematic. Indeed, most of the 
current policies regarding refugees’ resettlement are underlined by state interests rather than human 
interests, as hosting refugees and providing protection is costly. 206 
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The Convention of 1951, despite dealing with a phenomenon which calls for the use of international 
humanitarian law, is not a human rights document, but rather a document to regulate the post-
refugee flow order.207 Thus, another limit of the Convention is that the solutions put forward (ex: 
immediate humanitarian relief, construction of camps in host countries etc.) are not pre-emptive 
and do not offer long-term solutions as they do not deal with the root cause of refugee crises but 
rather tend to organize the refugee flows after the fact.208 The UNHCR mandate was not drafted to 
deal with the increasing number of refugees worldwide, and is not equipped to manage the 
protracted situations refugees find themselves in after fleeing.209  
 
b) Inconsistencies in practice: 
 
The Convention of 1951 does not provide the international community the conceptual  or the 
normative tools needed to secure a robust protection to the refugees, meaning there is no 
specification regarding how states should react to or assist refugee communities. Indeed, the 
CRSR’51 was not designed to establish a burden-sharing mechanism when dealing with refugee 
flows, which leaves the entire system vulnerable to interpretation of host states characterized by 
states’ interests.210 
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Most refugees tend to make rational decisions when it comes to choosing which country to relocate 
in. Some may want to migrate to neighbouring countries, especially in cases of refugee flows 
caused by conflict and when refugees have very limited resources, as it would be easier to return 
and the risks of transit are not as great; while others may seek refugee in countries who have a 
better welfare system and better job opportunities, mostly when they see the chances of going back 
as meagre. However, most decide to seek refuge in countries neighbouring their countries of origin 
– 92% of the world’s refugees have crossed only one border211 –which demands greater 
contribution to refugee assistance from some countries. This has resulted in both a total of only 10 
countries taking care of 75% of the global refugee populations212 and, in the shift in the perception 
of refugees from victims in need of international assistance, to an economic burden, from which 
countries tend to run away.213 Refugee resettlement would be much more practical, and much less 
contentious if there were to be a global burden-sharing mechanism that would alleviate the burden 
of hosting refugees.   
 
c) Migration channel: 
 
The Convention gives refugees the right to seek asylum, but the transit towards asylum is not taken 
into account in the document.214 Recent development in regards to how refugees get to host 
countries have become central to modern debates regarding the security of refugees, not only when 
they get to the host countries, but also during their migration. Indeed, refugees have now become 
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inter-continental, and are taking greater risks while fleeing persecution, as can be illustrated by the 
Syrian, Afghan and Libyan refugees taking boats across the Mediterranean to reach sanctuary in 
Europe.215 Besides, the inherent hazardous risks of travelling on a boat with a number of people 
exceeding the maximum capacity and with very little resources, which lead to thousands of deaths 
at sea, the rights of refugees under the Convention doesn’t extend on the seas, which leads to 
various attempts of potential host governments to go around the right of non-refoulement to find a 
non-illegal way to deter the arrival of refugees on their lands.216 This can be illustrated by Turkish 
authority targeting refugee boats as a way to inhibit them from reaching the shores of Greece.217 It 
can also be exemplified by the recent EU-Turkish deal, which creates a cap of refugees in Turkey 
as a way to prevent refugees to leave and go to Greece, which would eventually lead them to go to 
other key European countries.218 
 
Furthermore, while the convention explicitly forbids the refoulement of refugees, the document 
does not give the refugees the right to enter.219 Indeed, we are seeing instances of thousands of 
refugees being detained at the border in Italy, Australia, Austria or Hungary. Detention centres 
doesn’t only strip refugees from their dignity by criminalizing them upon their arrival and often 
resulting into people trying to enter the country illegally, but also makes it difficult for relief 
agencies to operate. Refugees can stay in those detention centres for up to two years, while waiting 
to be processed and registered with UNHCR, only then will they be moved to a refugee camp; 
however, in certain instances refugees, even when registered, refugees still do not have the right to 
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enter the country. For example, Australia has detained most of the refugees trying to reach its shores 
and placed them on two of its islands, Nauru and Manus Islands (closing later this year), without 
any prospect of hosting them on mainland Australia.220  
 
d) Lack of re-resettlement framework: 
 
The last critique of the established forced migration framework is that the Convention does not 
mention solutions for promoting the right of return. Indeed, today, refugee crises seem to have 
elongated, and the hopes and prospects of returning home have become dim.221 Refugees’ stay in 
host countries have become less ephemeral, which blurs the line between refugees and economic 
migrants; this, coupled with the lack of efforts to integrate refugees in the host society, as a way to 
promote return to home states, undermine the right of return to countries of origins. Additionally, 
the Convention does not give the ability of refugees to return home, as with the conditions of their 
transit to the host country, it is the responsibility of the refugee to find a way to go back home.222  
 
However, this is probably the most controversial criticism made in regards to the Convention 
Relating to the Status refugees, as it has undertones of mass deportation and doesn’t ensure that 
refugees, once back, won’t be victims of persecution all over again. Furthermore, the safekeeping 
of the right of return has often been politicized as used as justification to avoid both giving 
permanent membership to the host countries to the refugees, and governmental involvement in the 
refugee resettlement process (ex: Lebanon with Palestinian refugees.) 
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The inherent shortcomings of the CRSR’51 have led many to argue that it is too idealistic in 
inhibiting the integration and protection of refugees in host countries, and therefore should be re-
drafted to better circumscribe the needs of the international refugee population. However, this is a 
dangerous enterprise, as the narrative around refugees regarding their impact on societies has 
changed. Indeed, as mentioned, refugees are seen as an economic burden, at best, and a security 
threat, at worst. Indeed, the moral framework within which the CRSR’51 was drafted was one 
where refugees were seen as helpless and in need of assistance, allowing for the Convention to set 
a high moral benchmark the participatory countries have to, theoretically, abide to; a re-drafting 
would most probably lower that moral benchmark. Additionally, a refugee is only considered a 
refugee if she or he crosses one border; the crossing of a second border, or even a third in the case 
of Syrian refugees attempting to reach European countries, has blurred the lines between economic 
migrant and refugee. The re-drafting would consequently be heavily influenced by the interests of 
states who are desperately attempting to keep refugee flows from penetrating the country. This 
tendency can be exemplified by the recent EU-Turkish deal, which creates a cap of refugees in 
Turkey as a way to prevent refugees to leave and go to Greece, which would eventually lead them 
to go to other key European countries.223 Therefore, despite the criticism of the Convention being 
inadequate in dealing with the current demands of refugee protection because of the room it leaves 
for interpretation, it is precisely this lack of precision that could allow for innovative proposals to 
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CHAPTER 5 – A DOOMED REFUGEE PROTECTION FRAMEWORK? (PART II) 
THE ROLE OF DEVELOPMENT ACTORS IN FIRST COUNTRIES OF ASYLUM 
 
The numbers related to forced displacement seem colossal as UNHCR has accounted for more than 
65 million people displaced from their home, both inside their country and internationally. This 
accounts for less than 1% of the total world population.224 The total number of international 
refugees amounts to less than 24 million individuals, representing less than 10% of the total world 
migrant flows.225 Therefore, this crisis can be managed.  However, as mentioned, the current tools 
used by the international community to respond to the refugee crises fail to match the scale and 
complexity of the phenomenon, especially since both the needs and the demands have changed 
tremendously due to the protracted and urban nature of the displacement of refugees. Indeed, 
protracted displacement calls for access to: education, healthcare and economic recovery 
opportunities. The established humanitarian instruments utilized often focus on the basic needs and 
short-term funding, making them limited both in scope and scale when dealing with the long-term 
displaced communities; consequently, scholars and practitioners have lobbied for the introduction 
of development actors when dealing with the ever-increasing refugee populations. 
 
The development actors’ relation with host governments are far different than the one shared by 
humanitarian agencies and governments. Humanitarian actors often find themselves at odds with 
the state from the very beginning due to the unwillingness to negotiate on moral standards, whereas 
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development actors can better negotiate with the government and bring solutions that make the 
host state part of the solution rather than part of the problem (ex: formalizing refugees and giving 
them work permits.) As a result, relevant international agencies initiated a move towards a 
development approach to forced migration. The involvement of development actors in the refugee 
problem represents a step in the right direction; it allows for greater capital to be invested in the 
cause and for a solution that incorporates both the refugee communities and the host countries’ 
population. This trend aims at transitioning the current forced displacement framework from one 
of immediate relief to one of development. Despite previous failed attempts to enable this 
transition, the Syrian refugee population has created a new political and humanitarian impetus for 
non-traditional actors’ involvement the protection and management of forced migrants. 
Consequently, we are seeing a convergence in the agendas of humanitarian agencies and 
development actors.  
 
This chapter addresses the role development actors can play in managing refugees and host 
communities in countries of first asylum. It is based on the World Bank Report (September 2016) 
regarding the role of development actors in dealing with forced displacement. It argues that the 
participation of development actors would promote long term and sustainable solutions by 
encouraging refugees’ self reliance rather than dependence on humanitarian agencies. It tries to do 
so by exploring the development actors’ role in: managing host communities, reducing 
vulnerabilities, and rebuilding lives. This section also presents three current development projects 
in countries hosting large refugee populations, from which Lebanon could benefit: The Graduation 




a) Managing changes for host communities: 
 
The majority of the world’s forcibly displaced population are concentrated in underdeveloped or 
developing countries, where challenges concerning education, health and security were there even 
prior to the influx of refugees, but were exacerbated and multiplied with their arrival. Indeed, the 
host community’s initial equilibrium is disrupted by the large influx of refugees due to the increase 
in demands of service and the time the supply needs to take to adjust to change; however, overtime 
a new set of equilibria emerges.226 The question becomes whether or not this new environment is 
more conducive to poverty reduction projects. Key Poverty Index tend to reduce with the arrival 
of a large number of asylum seekers, as they often reside in poor urban centres where responses to 
demands are already spotty before their arrival or in camps, which may heighten challenges while 
reducing opportunities for the host country to benefit from the displaced community’s presence.227 
Humanitarian actors often increase poverty and indirectly slow down development, whereas non-
traditional actors, especially development actors, can use this gap in the resettlement framework to 
introduce development projects within this new equilibrium.228 
 
Development actors should assist host countries to absorb the shock of the large influx of the 
forcibly displaced, and help them make further progress, or at least avoid interruption, in the hosts’ 
own development and poverty reduction efforts. To do so, they could engage in various sectors: 
enhance assistance to help deal with the pre-existing issues through the traditional development 
programs; help support the communities most vulnerable and the most negatively impacted by the 
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arrival refugees among the host communities; and, to support and encourage sound policies on: the 
right to work, encampment and the delivery of aid.229 
 
Tackling of pre-existing development problems: 
The support of development actors of the traditional development agenda is critical in the response 
to manage a refugee crisis, due to the already slow development characteristic of the majority of 
host countries. To do so, forced displacement considerations should be integrated in the host 
countries’ development strategies as to re-calibrate and adapt to the changing need. Part of this 
redefinition of priorities amongst the host communities should be an emphasis on the right to work 
and employment.230  
 
Support the ones who are negatively impacted 
Forced displacement’s impact on the host communities is unevenly distributed; consequently, 
development actors should be able to identify the groups who may need the most support, evaluate 
their respective vulnerabilities and assess the coping strategies and the political economy to identify 
the entry points to provide assistance. Emphasis should be put on labour market interventions, such 
as developing programs to upgrade the work skills and enhance their employment opportunities as 
a strategy to alleviate the competition on the job market.231 Here, the expertise of development 
actors in such projects would be key, but there is a need for a parallel action to strengthen and to 
tailor the weak social protection programs, especially in the labour market as development actors 
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would be operating in difficult regions. For example, upgrading the skills of the working force 
could be problematic due to instances of illiteracy or the age of the active population.232 
 
Promote freedom of movement, the right to work and improvements in aid delivery 
Development actors would also be able to promote host-friendly solutions to the relevant host 
stakeholders and external agencies, as a way to benefit both the displaced and the host communities. 
For instance, the common governmental restrictive policies regarding refugees (ex: denial of the 
right to work, restrictions on the freedom of movement) have been largely ineffective to address 
the concerns of security and unemployment.233 Incentives to loosen the host communities policies 
regarding the displaced could incorporate: aid programs that target both the refugees and the hosts; 
the use of cash rather than humanitarian assistance (products, services etc.), as it can lead to the 
boosting of the local production and create economic opportunities; and, initiate the gradual 
transition of aid delivery mechanisms towards the use of country systems which could have for 
impact the bettering of the relations between the two communities (ex: delivery of education 
services).234 
 
Help host countries and communities prepare: 
Episodes of waves of forced displacement can often be predicted, leaving time for potential host 
countries to prepare to better mitigate the immediate impact of refugees. For instance, an early 
warning mechanism can be implemented to forecast waves of displacement. While scholars and 
humanitarians have, through the years, attempted to identify parameters to predict episodes of force 
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displacement, they fell short.235 However, the emergence of big data has made it possible to engage 
in a new approach as it has been proven to be effective in forecasting the timing and volume of 
economic migration to areas.236 The challenge becomes to extend this mechanism as to fit the one 
of forced displacement. This potential development agenda regarding the forcibly displaced is 
largely unexplored, but is inspired by other relatively successful shock management programs (ex: 
natural disasters.)237 
 
Example of development project: economic zones in Jordan 
The Jordanian government, with the help of the World Bank and the UK, has developed a program 
that directly addresses the refugee crisis by developing jobs for both Syrians and Jordanians in a 
special economic zone. The investors in such zone would be required to employ a quota of Syrians 
in their workforce. The incentive behind this “Compact Program”, introduced at the Supporting 
Syrian and the Region Conference in London, in February 2016, rests on developing new economic 
opportunities through an enhanced access to the EU market, and through the relaxation of rules-of-
origins requirements for products manufactured in such special economic zones. Jordan is ranked 
113 on the WBG doing Business Index, therefore, the core challenge of this project will be to attract 
investors by improving the business environment. The government has already taken steps, such 
as the issuing of work permits for Syrian refugees to be employed in the zones, and providing 
training for the displaced to meet the required qualifications.238 Indeed, the operation will provide 
support to Jordanian authorities in the issuance of up to 200,000 work permits for Syrian refugees. 
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The rationale behind the project was to formalize the Syrian refugees in Jordan who are already 
engaged in the informal labour market, as a way to benefit both the refugee community and the 
Jordanian economy. The operation will also finance the support for developing private sector 
activities to broaden and diversify the type of work offered to the displaced.239 
 
The formalizing and introduction of refugees on the market would not only allow for economic 
development and revenues that could benefit both the refugee populations and the host 
communities, but would also allow for a less exclusionary behaviour towards refugees. By 
integrating the refugees in the society through labour, the protection gaps mentioned in Chapter 3 
would narrow down, and violence against both the nationals and the refugees would potentially 
decrease. This could be extremely beneficial in Lebanon, undergoing a severe economic crisis and 
where the tensions between the host and refugee communities are increasing alarmingly.  
 
b) Reducing vulnerabilities: 
 
The main purpose of introducing a development response to the displacement dilemma is to 
overcome the displacement-induced vulnerabilities, which impedes the ability of the displaced to 
seize potential opportunities and expose them to risks of lasting poverty. The key drivers of 
mitigating vulnerabilities are employment and economic opportunities – they might not suffice on 
their own, but they are necessary and should be integral parts of short, medium and long-term 
solutions. We have discussed the importance of less restrictive policies concerning the right to 
work and the freedom of movement, but development actors should also look at programs aimed 
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at creating opportunities, the building and tailoring of skills and continuing the support of the 
vulnerable.240 
 
Create opportunities rather than de-facto exile: 
While creating opportunities for the displaced requires a significant financial investment, over the 
years, there have been various externally funded aid programs aimed at creating jobs and enhancing 
livelihoods. To ensure success and sustainability, such activities should be within the private sector 
and market-driven programs; attracting the private sector is therefore key for the programs.241 
While public works programs and other subsidized schemes provide immediate relief, the latter is 
only temporary and needs to be rapidly followed by private sector-led professional opportunities. 
The private sector investment in refugee-hosting is mostly driven by business considerations, such 
as the  demand from local and international markets, the availability of skilled workers, the quality 
of the existing infrastructures etc. Here, development actors could play a key role by providing 
guarantees and loans or equity investments to private investors to incentivize the private sector to 
get involved and invest in the project.242 
 
Build skills tailored to the local labour market needs: 
Another obstacle to development, besides the lack of opportunities, is the gap between the existing 
skills of refugees and the existing professional opportunities. To reduce the mismatch between the 
two, development actors could, and are, developing programs to upgrade and refine the forcibly 
displaced’s skills. To do so, a careful analysis of the demand in the labour market should be 
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provided; however, this becomes complicated when the labour market is saturated, like Lebanon.243 
In such cases, development actors’ efforts should also be aimed at strengthening the capacity to 
seize future opportunities both in the current environment and in possible future destinations, by 
focusing on helping the refugees develop language and transferrable skills rather than environment 
specific skills. Simultaneously, development actors are working on providing education services 
to children of displacement to avoid a lost generation scenario in the host community and at 
home.244  
 
Continue supporting the vulnerable: 
While creation of opportunities, with the help of non-traditional actors, is available for the 
displaced in host communities, there are still minorities (ex: the disabled, the elderly, the 
unaccompanied children, PTSD victims etc.) who need dedicated support as they may not be able 
to access such opportunities, and therefore leave them exposed to heightened risks. However, 
leaving them as the responsibility of humanitarian agencies will not solve the problem of self-
reliance; thus, development actors could intervene by presenting and sharing the lessons learned in 
the modernizing of social protection systems to inform the debate on aid effectiveness.245 
Development actors might also want to expand their programs in areas key to the success of 
development programs and where there is no track record of effective intervention, such as issues 
related to mental health and psychological services. 
 
Example of development project: Re-designing of camps by Ennead 
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Ennead is an architectural company who, in collaboration with Stanford University and UNHCR, 
has taken on the project of redesigning and rethinking the architectural design of refugee camps in 
an attempt to enable refugees to access and live in dignified and secure settlements, that could 
improve their social, economic and environmental quality of life as a community by allowing for 
a do-it-yourself approach to life in camps. While Ennead is not a development actor per say, its 
project aims at promoting development in camp and host countries settings. 
 
The project came to life in response to the need to change UNHCR’s approach to resettlement in 
camps as: to make the relationship between the displaced and the host communities mutually 
beneficial, to plan for durable and realistic solutions, and to come up with rational exit strategies.246 
The project is a direct response for the urbanization of resettlement camps and relies on the Toolkit, 
which is a systematic framework for integrating information, design, required technical tools and 
the expertise of multiple leaders in various disciplines and stakeholders to ameliorate settlement 
plans. The Toolkit aims at enabling UNHCR to achieve more holistic resettlement sites for the 
displaced, beginning with the selection of potential camp sites – taking into account ecological 
considerations, architectural designs of the camps – and with the defining of the means required to 
forge a sustainable relation between the refugees and the host communities. The Toolkit’s aims 
directly address the previously mentioned gaps the refugees faced when displaced abroad; indeed, 
the framework would benefit the communities impacted by the displacement by improving their 
health, safety, and access to education and economic opportunities. Besides undermining the limbo 
state refugees find themselves in, the project also helps pivot the perception of refugees to one of 
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partners in development, rather than parasites, by “dissolving borders between the familiar and the 
other.”247 
 
The project is currently taking place in the Zaatari camp in Jordan due to the realization that organic 
development in refugee camps is unstoppable, and should therefore be leveraged. Most of the shops 
in the camp are unauthorized, creating a black market undermining the legitimate Jordanian 
businesses, and indirectly profiting criminal gags inside and outside the camps.248 For instance, 
refugees at Zaatari steal the electricity that powers their shops and appliances, which amounts to 
approximately a $750,000 loss, creating an unsustainable burden for the UN and Jordan; as a result, 
a redesign of the camps, such as installing circuit breaks or working on a payment plan establishing 
monthly fees for shop owners or refugees with appliances demanding electricity, so the system 
would not collapse.249  
 
The re-designing project will also take into account the vulnerabilities of minority groups inherent 
to the phenomenon of forced migration and of protracted situations, such as sexual violence or 
contamination of water resources. The latter takes into account the placement of bathroom facilities 
(i.e. locks on the doors, bathroom for women in a safe area etc.) and of the water resources (i.e. far 
away from the sewage system infrastructure). By introducing a non-traditional actor in the process, 
whose main priority is think of practical considerations, this allows for a more context-specific 







approach to the different refugee hosting situations and complements the efforts humanitarian 
agencies, whose main priority is response to basic needs, often at the expense of practicality. 
 
c) Rebuilding lives: 
 
Support the return of communities: 
A range of activities is required from development actors to successfully support the  displaced 
population who wants to return home. The first one is continuous support of other agencies, 
primarily UNHCR, to help organize the inherently spontaneous move back home.  Monitoring the 
flow of return would also allow the development actors to be able to determine what are the places 
of return of refugees and that therefore are in the most need of support, which will in turn lead to 
development actors tapping into their extensive experience in supporting conflict recovery to get 
involved in the home country’s recovery.250 
 
Integration in host communities: 
While return of displaced communities is often hope for, 86% of refugees decide not to return 
home, resulting in a de-facto integration in the host countries due to the protracted nature of their 
displacement; therefore, development actors should aim at promoting the provision of legal status 
and opportunities to the previously displaced.251 However, host countries are often reluctant in 
giving a permanent status to refugees, as their integration may exacerbate the fragile environment-
-and the conditions for hosting them relied on the fact that they were supposed to stay in the country 
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temporarily. In those cases, a flexible approach is needed; one that would directly address the 
concerns of the local population and governments.252 
 
To avoid limbo situations: 
Limbo has become a key characteristic of displacement across the host communities, even in cases 
where legal integration and membership to another state are possible, as a result of long-term stays 
in camps and dependency on humanitarian assistance. Here, development actors could engage 
along two axes: they could support initiatives to transform camps into settlements and efforts to 
integrate these camps in the local economy; or, they could help transform the camps based on the 
modern social protection systems where stakeholders would be encouraged to distinguish between 
the highly vulnerable groups, who would need targeted assistance on the long term, and the people 
who have the ability to work but are discouraged because of the humanitarian aid provided.253 
 
Example of a development project: The Graduation Approach 
 
This approach is aimed at supporting people living in extreme poverty and at “helping them 
graduate out of it.” It was first implemented by BRAC, a Bangladeshi NGO, with the support of 
the World Bank Organization and the Ford Foundation, but is now being tested in eight countries. 
The approach includes sequences of 18 to 36 month sets of intervention in: consumption stipends 
to ensure food security until income generation from professional activities, training to kick-start 
the economy, financial education, and monitoring of households on a weekly basis. The assessment 
of the Graduation Approach by Innovations for Poverty Action showed evidence of  breaking 
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through the poverty tap with an overall increase of earnings by 37%, and of consumption by 43% 
over a nine years’ period. UNHCR has recognized the potential of the Approach if it is tailored for 
refugees (i.e. incorporate legal assistance and psychological counselling); it is currently being 
tested in five countries where there are rural, urban and camp settings (Zambia, Egypt, Costa Rica, 




The introduction of development actors in the solution to the refugee problem seems like the logical 
next step in amending the refugee framework due to the current protracted nature of displacement. 
Indeed, besides bringing in monetary support, development actors and their partners can re-
calibrate the aims and strategies when dealing with forced displacement. Development actors bring 
their skills and expertise of dealing with extreme poverty and with navigating states within which 
they operate, to prevent governments from becoming obstacles. The World Bank’s report on the 
how development actors should intervene is thorough and coherent, and introduces concepts, such 
as pre-emption of heavy migration flows and tailored refugee training, that the humanitarian 
agencies could not have taken on due to: their lack of knowledge in certain fields, the rigidity of 
their structure and their economic limitations. However, development actors should not replace 
humanitarian agencies; the latter set of actors should complement each other rather than compete 
with one another. The task therefore becomes to establish a way to efficiently coordinate the aims 
and efforts of two essentially different actors. 
  
                                                     




The dissertation has tried to convey, through the deconstruction of the securitization of refugees 
from Syria in Lebanon, that the securitization process is socially and politically constructed to 
benefit the aims of the securitizing actors. Indeed, by dealing with the issue of refugees through 
emergency politics, the securitizing actors are given unlimited and exceptional power to undermine 
the perceived threat. However, as mentioned, not every issue needs to be securitized; a lot needs to 
be aligned for securitization to occur. The latter elements are: a receptive audience, a context fertile 
for securitization, and established practices. All three are present in Lebanon, which has allowed 
for a quick securitization of refugees from Syria since 2011. Indeed, the context of Lebanon is 
particularly complex; the country has suffered many traumas and has had a very tumultuous 
relationship with the government of Syria. The country has not yet finished grieving the atrocities 
of the civil war, which has led many to argue that the conflict is not resolved, leaving the country 
under a permanent ceasefire. Indeed, the pre-empting of threats and the paranoia-like behaviour of 
states, such as Lebanon, regarding the refugees gives them a particular agency in a context within 
which they are seen as destabilizing. As a result, it becomes crucial to initiate attempts to de-
escalate the issue to the realm of normal politics. This can be done by assessing and understanding 
the limits of the current international refugee framework, and by allowing for the intervention of 
non-traditional actors in the process of refugee management, such as development actors and their 
partners, especially in countries of first asylum. A better infrastructure of refugee management and 
protection would allow for a fairer burden-sharing system and for an alleviation of the 
consequences of protracted displacement in hosting countries, which in turn could result both in a 
new perception and narrative regarding refugees in the neighbouring countries, and better prospects 
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